In
1637, René Descartes published his Discourse on the Method,1introducing concepts that would form the underpinnings of
the Age of Reason. In many ways, the way we think today has been shaped by
concepts put forth in “the Discourse.” For example, we take it for granted
that we are rational beings and that we are capable of thinking things through
and making rational decisions.
Descartes’
method was simple, and the way we think about decision-making today is similar
and equally simple. To make a decision, you take in information from the world
using whatever sources you can find. You combine that information with what
you already know — historical data or previous experience. Then you reach a
conclusion and do something about it. Decisions always result in behavior of
some sort. It all sounds very rational.
Yet,
in recent years, advances in brain science, spurred by new technology, have
begun to shock us with the realization that even the most rational of us can be irrational at times. Neuro-scientist Joseph LeDoux in his book The
Emotional Brain,2 for example, demonstrated that much of
the time people do things for reasons that they can’t understand and then make
up rational-sounding explanations for their behavior.
Another
neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio, showed that, contrary to what Plato and
Descartes told us, emotion is essential for making decisions. For that reason,
Damasio’s best-selling book is titled Descartes’ Error.3 Synthesizing some of this recent research in his book How
We Decide,4 Jonah Lehrer wrote: “Reason without
emotion is impotent.”
Henry
James, known as the “father of psychology,” was the first to start attacking
the Platonic view of man as a perfectly rational animal with none of the
instincts that we associate with lower animals. Moreover, James put forth the
idea that these instincts were not necessarily a bad thing but, quite the
contrary, they were essential for making the brain work efficiently. His view
was that the brain had two main modes of operation: the rational and the
emotional. ...
